Quanto piace al mondo è breve sogno. Petrarch and Schopenhauer: Elective Affinities by Vettore, Enrico
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age, 1.1 (2011) 
ISSN: 2158-3846 (online) 
http://journals.oregondigital.org/hsda/ 
DOI: 10.5399/uo/HSDA.1.1.1191  
 
  170 
 
Quanto piace al mondo è breve sogno. 
Petrarch and Schopenhauer: Elective Affinities 
Enrico Vettore, California State University, Long Beach 
Abstract: Art plays a fundamental role in Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical system, and among the many artists who Schopenhauer 
cites, Francis Petrarch may be considered the most significant. 
Schopenhauer includes Petrarch among his favorite authors, referring 
to him as “the poet of [his] heart” and quoting him in those parts of The 
World as Will and Representation and Parerga and Paralipomena that 
center on the topics of ethics and the art of living. In this essay, I 
analyze Schopenhauer’s most significant passages on Petrarch, suggest 
connections between those passages, and conclude that, for 
Schopenhauer, the Italian poet is much more than a poet; he is a true 
sage whose words one can turn to for comfort. Petrarch is a thinker, a 
promoter of solitary life and the love of knowledge, a writer of 
philosophy and, although only in part, even an ascetic man. From 
Schopenhauer’s writing, it appears that Petrarch encompasses many of 
the features of the ideal Schopenhauerian man: someone who 
understands the senselessness of life, who has succeeded in denying 
the Will and has been able to express it through his poetry, his 
philosophical writings and his life choices. Petrarch’s verses 
foreshadow the basic ideas of Schopenhauer’s philosophy; his actions 
and his example serve not only as a model and inspiration for the 
readers of Schopenhauer but also for the German philosopher himself. 
“Petrarch has always been and will remain the poet of my heart.” 
(Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena 2: 443) 
Author Bryan Magee was working on The Philosophy of Schopenhauer when he met the 
Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges who was enthusiastic about Magee’s latest project. 
Borges made no secret of the significant impact the German philosopher had had on his own 
life, having specifically studied German in order to be able to read Arthur Schopenhauer in 
the original, and shared another interesting detail with Magee. Borges had often been asked 
why he, who had such a predilection for complex constructs, had never attempted to 
explicate his vision of the world systematically—to which he consistently responded that 
such a project had already been brought to fruition, to wit, by Schopenhauer himself.  
Schopenhauer’s philosophy has played, and continues to play, a significant role in the 
realm of the arts, and Borges was far from the only one to succumb to its attraction. In fact, 
although Schopenhauer’s influence is clearly recognizable in the works of psychologists and 
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philosophers (Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, Wittgenstein) and has contributed to the foundation 
of the fundamental concepts of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology (Young 221-46), 
there is no doubt that musicians like Wagner, Mahler, and Strauss and writers including 
Thomas Mann, Conrad, and Tolstoy (among countless others) have been the most receptive 
to Schopenhauer’s ideas on art and his worldview. Moreover, Schopenhauer always held 
artists and writers in the highest esteem, and there is ample evidence that he had a special 
affinity for Petrarch. There is no basis for establishing a hierarchy of authors cited by 
Schopenhauer, and this essay does not propose to do so; however, in examining the 
citations of Petrarch chosen by Schopenhauer, it would appear that his fondness for the 
Italian poet involves not only Petrarch’s exquisite literary qualities but, in a wider sense, his 
philosophical and exemplary characteristics as well. An example of this attraction and of 
the importance Schopenhauer attributed to Petrarch as a moralist can be found immediately 
at the threshold of The World as Will and Representation—most specifically in the preface 
of the third edition of the work (1859). 
Schopenhauer’s cosmopolitan background had allowed him to acquire extensive 
knowledge of both modern and ancient languages. In addition to German, he read Greek, 
Latin, English, French, Italian. and Spanish and their respective literatures. He found this 
knowledge to be particularly helpful while writing The World as Will.1 Because art 
occupied a position of some significance in his system of philosophy, quotations from both 
ancient and modern authors abound in his work as a matter of course. A quick glance at the 
analytical index of The World as Will confirms this assertion. There are few philosophers 
who cite literary texts as widely as Schopenhauer. At this point in his career, Schopenhauer 
had at last attained the fame he had always longed for but which had eluded him since 
1818, the year the first edition was published. Finally, celebrities and artists like Richard 
Wagner and others flocked to him, wrote to him, and regarded him as a maestro. 
Universities were offering courses where his philosophy was studied, and artists were 
beginning to appreciate and discuss his ideas on the visual arts and music. For him, this 
was total success: his philosophy was at last accepted and appreciated. 
With publication of the third edition of The World as Will, Schopenhauer decided to add 
a new brief preface in which he reflected upon the destiny of his work in a manner that was, 
for him, unusually subdued. Many a work—and most likely his were not the only ones—
had not been able to benefit the world since those who were themselves incapable of 
producing such works had found ways to hinder them and prevent them from gaining 
ground (WWR 1: xxviii). As a consequence, Schopenhauer had to wait until he was seventy-
two years of age to see the publication of this third and final edition of the work that he had 
conceived and realized back when he was thirty. Despite this adversity, he stated that he 
found comfort in the words expressed in Petrarch’s De vera sapientia, “Si quis, tota die 
correns, pervenit ad vesperam, satis est” (“If anyone who wanders all day arrives towards 
evening, it is enough”) (xxviii).2 Schopenhauer then added that if he also arrived towards 
evening, he could only hope that the influence of his work would last longer in proportion 
to the lateness of its beginning. Could the reconciled and even optimistic tone 
Schopenhauer used to discuss the citation from Petrarch be attributed to the very presence 
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of this excerpt itself, which he had just experienced directly, or could it be the consequence 
of a longstanding familiarity with Petrarch? 
Schopenhauer had already quoted Petrarch in passing in the second edition of The 
World as Will, but the presence of the words of the Italian poet in such a privileged place as 
the preface to the final edition reconfirms how important Petrarch had always been for 
Schopenhauer throughout his entire career. Petrarch is not only an author to whom one 
turns for his intuition, anticipating and confirming one’s own philosophic discoveries, but 
he is also a sage who proffers words that provide comfort. He is not just a poet whose 
writings have attained an unsurpassed level of purity and style, he is also a philosophical 
thinker whose ideas and reasoning are comparable to those of the most systematic thinkers. 
Furthermore, the significance of the place where Schopenhauer chose to cite Petrarch is also 
crucial. The preface is paradoxically the first and the last place in the text related to space 
and time: it is the first because, spatially, it is the one immediately preceding the text for 
which it opens the way; and it is the last because it is, chronologically, the final one to be 
written. One could say with some emphasis that Petrarch is the name that opens the way 
and closes the journey of The World as Will. In this major work, Schopenhauer cites 
Petrarch nine times, but he also cites him once in On the Basis of Morality and then, with 
greater license and in a more personal way, five times in the Parerga and Paralipomena. 
In analyzing the importance of the most significant citations, we will attempt to clarify 
the relationship between Schopenhauer and Petrarch. To that end, however, it behooves us 
to offer a necessarily brief synthesis of the thinking of the German philosopher. 
Schopenhauer believes that the external world is but appearance: it is only the result of the 
patterns that dominate our capacities to perceive. The real world—the one hidden behind 
appearance—is the Will, a blind and irrational force never satisfied with what it obtains. 
While the world of phenomena is made up of countless individual things according to their 
positions in time and space, the Will is one and a single unity, immutable and unknowable, 
without cause or goal, independent and beyond time and space. Two important 
consequences ensue: the first is that life is marked by suffering (since the Will can never be 
fulfilled); the second is that all phenomena (including human beings) share one 
fundamental identity and form essentially a single unity, given that these are but the result 
of the process of individuation which is the way in which the Will is objectified in time and 
space. It is from this fundamental unity that compassion, the foundation of Schopenhauer’s 
ethics, arises. 
In order to end this state of suffering and pain, Schopenhauer proposes three 
alternatives: the most practicable is the aesthetic experience (the core argument of the third 
book of The World as Will); the second is the exercise of compassion; and the third, the most 
radical, is the denial of the Will which leads directly to asceticism, to which Schopenhauer 
dedicates the fourth book of the work. As for art, Schopenhauer believes that in the moment 
of the aesthetic experience, the Will is placated and the subject is thus able to attain a level 
of detachment that allows for pure and disinterested cognition of the (Platonic) idea that lies 
behind the variety of phenomena. Moreover, it is in music that what is perceived is not a 
representation or a copy of the Platonic idea but, in substance, is the idea itself. 
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Experiencing art allows us to free ourselves, so to speak, from ourselves, from our ego that is 
the seat of the Will to live: 
…aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact that, 
when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above 
all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to speak, rid of ourselves. (WWR 
1: 390) 
This synthesis should offer a clear picture not only as to why the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer has fascinated so many musicians and writers but also why art was so 
important both structurally and instrumentally in the system of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
This comes about not only because through art is it possible to set aside the I and forget the 
Will, but also because of the strong affinity between poetry and philosophy. Thinking and 
poetizing, as Schopenhauer explains in the second volume of The World as Will, have in 
common the act of knowing; “poetry is related to philosophy as experience is to empirical 
science” (WWR 2: 427), just as experience allows us to become familiar with a specific 
phenomenon and, through examples, science embraces the totality of phenomena through 
universal concepts. Poetry makes Platonic ideas familiar to us through the particular or 
through examples, while, in the same way, philosophy shows us the underlying nature of 
those things that are expressed therein (427). The enrichment of the concepts (abstract and 
arid by nature) that we grasp through perception (rich and complete but incommunicable) is 
for Schopenhauer the common thread of both philosophy and poetry (74). 
Schopenhauer chose the first citation from Petrarch in his preface to The World as Will 
not only for Petrarch’s value as a poet, but also for the quality of the knowledge and the 
moral philosophy that Petrarch had exercised as poet and cultivator of the classics. Petrarch 
is thus introduced not only as a great lyrical poet whose renown Schopenhauer assumes is 
familiar to all his readers, but also as a man who has attained a high level of knowledge of 
himself and of the world and who has come to comprehend, intuitively as poet and 
intellectually as thinker, the true nature of the world and how to live in it. Petrarch, as we 
will see, becomes an increasingly exemplary figure for Schopenhauer. 
In this regard, it is of some interest to observe that the citations from Petrarch that appear 
in the first edition are not found in the third book, the one dedicated to the aesthetic 
experience, but appear instead in the fourth, the one centered on ethics, on the mystery of 
compassion and on the theory of denial of the Will—in other words, in the one which 
constitutes the final focus of Schopenhauer’s entire philosophy. Paragraph 64 of the third 
book studies the phenomenon of weeping (a phenomenon, like laughter, unique to human 
beings) that, for Schopenhauer, is caused not by actual pain when it is present and felt but 
only once the pain has already stopped (WWR 1: 376-77). Weeping is therefore connected to 
the representation in the memory of a past pain. In this case, we are the object of our own 
compassion, which emerges from our capacity for affection and sympathy and from our 
imagination. Empathy is the basis for compassion that comes from the awareness of the 
substantial identity of self and the other. While egoism cancels out the other, perceiving it 
as otherness, compassion allows us to see instead that it is only time and space that 
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determine the difference between the self and the other and that this is an illusion caused 
by the mental patterns tied to our perceptive capacity: “Indeed weeping is always regarded 
as a sign of a certain goodness of character, and it disarms anger. This is because it is felt 
that whoever is still able to weep must also necessarily be capable of affection, i.e. of 
sympathy towards others” (377). 
To illustrate his thinking, Schopenhauer uses verses 1-4 of Petrarch’s canzone 264 (“I’ vo 
pensando: e nel pensier m’assale”): 
I’ vo pensando: e nel pensier m’assale 
Una pietà sì forte di me stesso 
Che mi conduce spesso 
Ad alto lagrimar, ch’i non soleva. (377) 
As I wander in deep thought so strong a sympathy with myself comes over me, that 
I must often weep aloud, a thing I am otherwise not accustomed to do. 
Schopenhauer points out that, “The description which Petrarch gives of the rising of his 
own tears, naively and truly expressing his own feelings, is entirely in accordance with the 
explanation that has been given” (377). Julian Young reminds us that Schopenhauer often 
tends to attribute his own thoughts to certain predecessors (20), and this warning must 
certainly not be ignored. In this case, however, the objective is not to judge whether the 
German philosopher has correctly interpreted Petrarch but simply to understand what the 
relationship between Schopenhauer and Petrarch is and how Schopenhauer incorporates 
him into his system of philosophy. There can be no doubt that Petrarch is the focal point of 
the chapter. Schopenhauer has chosen him because he is the poet who has succeeded in 
expressing in the most crystalline form a phenomenon that is exquisitely human and is 
fundamental to the understanding of compassion, which could be called the cornerstone of 
the ethical system of Schopenhauer. 
Several pages later Schopenhauer calls upon Petrarch anew, not to quote him, but to set 
him forth as the example of a man who has successfully arrived at comprehending the 
vanity of the world and has comported himself accordingly. All springs forth from observing 
physiognomy: we associate the idea of nobility of character to a certain trace of silent 
sadness (WWR 1: 396). This results from knowledge of the vanity of all possessions and of 
the suffering of all life and not merely of one’s own. Such knowledge may be awakened by 
an individual experience of personal suffering. The Will, which has been irrevocably 
opposed by fate, is extinguished and ceases to strive. Schopenhauer asserts that this is the 
case for Petrarch in that his Daphne had vanished from his hands so that she might leave 
him the laurels of fame. A single desire whose fulfillment had been denied him had thus 
brought Petrarch to “that resigned sadness concerning the whole of life which appeals to us 
so pathetically in his works” (396). It cannot be clearly established to which portrait of 
Petrarch Schopenhauer is alluding in this case, but the importance of physical appearance 
for Schopenhauer is undeniable. In fact, for Schopenhauer, the body is one of the 
objectifications of the Will, and, once the latter has been subdued, the body reveals it 
through its posture and facial features. It would then appear that Schopenhauer, after having 
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invoked Petrarch as a wise person as well as a poet, wishes to offer his readers a more 
precise idea of Petrarch by analyzing his face. 
At this juncture, in order to wholly appreciate the significance of this passage, it would 
be advantageous to refer to the essay on physiognomy in the second volume of Parerga and 
Paralipomena. In this piece, Schopenhauer links the expression of the face with intelligence 
and wisdom and centers his discourse on Petrarch. The face is of the utmost importance, as 
it is the perfect expression of man. If the mouth does nothing but give words to the thoughts 
of a person (thoughts that might well not be original), the face, on the other hand, reveals a 
person’s true nature. Moreover, it is through the face that a person’s intellectual and 
spiritual qualities are best revealed. Reading a person’s face is therefore difficult but of the 
utmost importance and, should we be mistaken in our reading, we must certainly blame not 
the face but our own fears, apprehensions, and desires—in a word, we must blame our lack 
of objectivity. To prove his point, Schopenhauer offers the reader an anecdote that features 
Petrarch as protagonist. 3 One day, at the court of the Visconti, Duke Galeazzo asked his son, 
who was still a child, to pick out the wisest man amongst those present (Petrarch was part of 
this audience). After careful examination of the men, the child walked up to Petrarch, 
“seized him by the hand and led him to his father, to the great admiration of all those 
present” (Parerga 2: 640). Schopenhauer concludes that “nature sets the seal of her dignity 
on some privileged individuals so clearly that even a child is able to recognize it” (640). 
Furthermore, as we compare Schopenhauer’s comment on physiognomy in The World as 
Will (1: 396) to the anecdote told in Parerga (2: 640), even though they were written thirty 
years apart, what is quite clear is that, for Schopenhauer, Petrarch embodies a double 
ideal—that of the poet and that of the wise ascetic man. Nature may well have provided him 
with wisdom, but the loss of his Daphne has facilitated the denial of the Will, which adds to 
the typical somatic features of the genius (the facial expression, deep eyes), an air (or 
perhaps an aura) of silent sadness. Schopenhauer’s observations on the expressions of 
Petrarch’s face have been confirmed by Giuseppe Brivio, whom Schopenhauer believed to 
be a contemporary of the poet.4 
As for the ascetic aspects of Petrarch, it is not known whether Schopenhauer believes 
that this denial of the Will propitiated by an event—to wit the loss of Daphne—can be 
attributed to the ascetic practices of Petrarch, and confirmation of any knowledge of these 
practices cannot be found in his works. Nevertheless, in the Parerga, Schopenhauer pauses 
more than once to praise Petrarch’s writings on solitary life, which do approach asceticism 
in Petrarch (Blanchard 402). According to Blanchard, Petrarch’s ascetic practices were 
“mild” and “his recreation of the ascetic life is resoundingly scholarly and intellectual in its 
complexion and might be seen as a partial effort at a secularization of the monastic life” 
(404). Though what counts even more for Blanchard is that this asceticism is the direct 
result of “a specifically intellectual and textual set of practices” (406). For Schopenhauer, 
the kind of knowledge a saint or an ascetic can attain is intuitive, devoid of concepts and 
therefore unlike philosophical knowledge which feeds on concepts instead of intuition and 
is therefore transmissible but dry (WWR 2: 600). Petrarch, who according to Blanchard 
considers himself a “lay sage” (404), seems to have successfully created for himself a form of 
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asceticism that is unique, a form one might refer to as a hybrid that is, in Schopenhauerian 
terms, both poetic and philosophical. Asceticism of this kind aims at mortification and 
denial of the Will, but it does so intellectually, in a manner that is thus necessarily indirect 
and detached in the way of literary models. 
Petrarch’s asceticism was interpreted in Schopenhauer’s time as “no more than a 
redefinition of ascetic practices as the benign pursuit of scholarship and erudition” 
(Blanchard 407). Thus, Petrarch “built an ivory tower founded only upon a disinterested 
love of learning” (407). Schopenhauer could not but approve of such a definition since, once 
again, Petrarch appeared to be the invisible model, the point of reference for his 
philosophical system. In the Parerga’s most famous essay, “Aphorisms on the Wisdom of 
Life,” Schopenhauer asserts that worthy men realize that the scope of life is not happiness 
but experience, and in the end, once they have been accustomed to exchanging hope for 
knowledge, they can only agree with Petrarch’s words, “Altro diletto, che ’mparar, non 
provo” (“No other happiness than learning do I feel”) (Parerga 1: 413). Only a few pages 
after this, Schopenhauer cites the poet anew (Canzoniere, sonnet 221) as he explores the 
theme of solitary life for which Petrarch held a love so “strong and constant” (426). Later, in 
volume two, Schopenhauer also shows that he knows and appreciates other works by 
Petrarch such as De vita solitaria, De contemptu mundi and Consolatio utriusque fortunae 
(Parerga 2: 444). 
To these works we need to add the Familiares, where Schopenhauer finds in Petrarch a 
source of consolation.5 While writing about fame, Petrarch claims, “whoever produces a 
really great thought ... lives with posterity as well as for it” (476). It should come as no 
surprise that Schopenhauer chose this particular passage as he reflected upon his own 
situation. The absolute failure of the first edition of The World as Will (1818) had prostrated 
him; his philosophy, in which he had invested all his dreams of fame and success, had been 
totally ignored. Now he could find comfort in the words of Petrarch: according to the Italian 
poet, his philosophy and his thoughts were already alive in the future as well as for the 
future. In this future, a reader eager to meet the author, to know him and to speak with him, 
would be able to see his dream fulfilled. The author too “longed for a posterity which would 
acknowledge him and pay him the honor, gratitude and affection” that had been denied him 
in life (476). One can hardly help noticing how the quotation from Petrarch operates once 
again on two levels: Schopenhauer chose it to illustrate and support his ideas, but it also 
serves, perhaps essentially, to support his innermost conviction of the value of his writings 
in spite of the heretofore lack of public acknowledgment. 
The failure of the first edition of The World As Will brings Schopenhauer to spend a 
period of time in Italy followed by a second time between 1822 and 1823. Here, according to 
him, he learns to speak Italian so well that he sounds like a native, and he is happy to be 
able to formulate thoughts that only Dante and Petrarch had been able to conceive, thoughts 
that are inextricably linked to the language in which they were conceived (McGill 160). In 
his journals written during this period, Schopenhauer expresses his love of Petrarch and 
how he reads him for the beauty and the wonder it instills in him, adding that he holds no 
such affection for Dante whose dictatorial tone is offensive to him (174). Indeed, in the 
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second edition of The World as Will (1844), there appears to be some evidence of 
Schopenhauer’s ameliorated ability to appreciate Petrarch’s work in the original. 
Schopenhauer briefly comments on Petrarch’s language (WWR 2: 126) and on the cognitive 
and communicative capacities of his poetry that seems to proceed not in an analytical and 
systematic manner but, rather, by intuition and with gaps in thought (432). However, 
Schopenhauer again dedicates attention and space to Petrarch in the chapters devoted to 
ethics, specifically in one of the supplements to the fourth book entitled “Metaphysics of 
Sexual Love.” 
For Schopenhauer, an individual’s desire is at the mercy of an impersonal force. The 
belief that desire is personal and that it works in the individual’s self-interest is a complete 
delusion (538). Desire belongs to the species and is therefore infinite and eternal. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that poets are overwhelmed by the desire and suffering 
that stems from their own frustrated love. Their breast is too limited to hold desire and 
frustration, which are infinite (551). Schopenhauer asserts that there has been many a 
Petrarch who has had to drag the weight of amorous ardor, of an unrequited love, and who 
has sighed in solitary woods (576). “But in only one Petrarch,” the philosopher adds, “does 
there dwell the gift of poetry” (576). If his desire had been fulfilled, Petrarch would never 
have written verse (577). 
For the first time, Schopenhauer claims that Petrarch is thus both an individual and a 
member of the human species. As a human being, Petrarch embodies human desires 
perfectly: he is unique in that he has been able to understand those desires intuitively and, 
through poetry, has rendered them simultaneously individual and contingent, as well as 
eternal and universal, as is required, according to Schopenhauer, in the best art. If we then 
consider this discourse together with the text in which Schopenhauer addresses the poet’s 
physical appearance, it appears evident that in Petrarch, fate, poetry, denial of the Will, and 
philosophical interest (as it appears in the preface to The World as Will) are inextricably 
intertwined. The outcome is the portrait of a poet who knew to take advantage of his 
misfortune to deny the Will, who devoted many writings to this subject, who was able to 
intuitively comprehend the reality of the world through poetry, and who was able to 
communicate this intuition to his readers. One of these intuitions, perhaps the most 
important for Schopenhauer, is expressed in the sonnet 231, “Mille piacer’ non vagliono un 
tormento” (“A thousand pleasures do not compensate for one pain”) which Schopenhauer 
quotes in his chapter on the vanity and suffering of life (576). This is also the philosopher’s 
final parting with Petrarch in his major work. Here, Schopenhauer uses this final quotation 
from Petrarch as evidence that the active principle in life is pain and suffering and that good 
is nothing but absence of suffering. 
Conclusions 
It is most probable that Schopenhauer deliberately ignored Petrarch’s constant 
oscillations between worldly desires and spiritual longings, between his desire for fame and 
his love of solitary life. Schopenhauer’s Petrarch seems to have found his equilibrium 
thanks to the help of destiny who deprived him of his Daphne, through the denial of the 
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Will, and through a hybrid brand of asceticism. The philosopher focuses on Petrarch’s thirst 
for knowledge, his constant self-analysis, and the sincerity and precision of his poetry when 
it comes to expressing the most subtle stirrings of the soul. Petrarch, for Schopenhauer, is 
the poet who was able to grasp reality and had no rivals when it came to expressing his 
perpetual search for a literary style, permeated with knowledge, readings, and syncretism, 
and a lifestyle solitary and detached from earthly matters. Schopenhauer was bound to yield 
to the strong attraction the figure of Petrarch held for him, for there were too many 
commonalities in their ways of thinking. Petrarch the artist and Petrarch the ascetic devoted 
to solitary life represent the means and the end that Schopenhauer proposes as the ultimate 
goal of his philosophy where figures of saints and ascetics play a significant role. 
Yet, the poet Petrarch is also a man of thought as confirmed by his philosophical 
preparation and writings. The combination of these two aspects of his personality would 
appear to furnish those elements that Schopenhauer deemed significant in the pursuit of the 
knowledge of life and of the best possible way to live it. In other words, Schopenhauer sees 
Petrarch as an inextricable amalgam of poet, ascetic, and philosopher, a model to imitate or 
through whose words it is possible to find solace. Petrarch’s presence can be perceived in 
Schopenhauer’s complete works, as it is to him that Schopenhauer constantly turned 
throughout his career. 
 
 
                                               
1 The World as Will and Representation has been abbreviated as The World as Will in this 
text and as WWR in all parenthetical references. 
2 All translations from Petrarch’s original Latin and Italian into English are by E.F.J. Payne.  
3 Schopenhauer finds this anecdote in Gerolamo Squarciafico’s Vita Petrarchae (1501). The 
specific episode, Squarciafico notes, was mentioned in Giueppe Brivio’s panegyric of 
Petrarch which, unfortunately, is now lost (Solerti 356). 
4 It is possible that Schopenhauer did not know that Brivio was born (in 1378) after 
Petrarch’s death (1374). It is however worth noting that he deems the episode “credible” 
(Parerga 640) not because of Brivio’s testimony but because it logically follows the 
philosophical premises of his own physiognomy. 
5 Schopenhauer quotes this work in the 1492 Venetian edition. 
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